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Earlier this year, the Supreme 
Court of India upheld the 
constitutional validity of  the 
Right of Children to Free and 
Compulsory Education Act 2009 
and  the Supreme Court of the 
United States likewise upheld the 
Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, 2010. The two pieces 
of legislation attempt to expand, 
to a greater or lesser degree, 
the provision of education and 
health services, respectively. This 
article attempts to understand 
and evaluate the policy debates 
and legal decisions around the 
two Acts as attempts by two 
constitutional liberal democracies 
to clarify the relationship 
between the state and private 
sector, and their respective roles 
and responsibilities to secure 
social welfare.
Introduction
On 9 July 2012, the United States Supreme Court narrowly upheld1 the constitutionality of the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
2010 (hereafter ACA) more commonly 
known as Obamacare. Predictably, a 
torrent of commentary follo wed which 
tried to parse the motivations for and the 
implications of the decision. The com-
ments range from the predict ably over-
blown right-wing rhetoric  predicting the 
impending destruction of American ex-
ceptionalism2 to elaborate evaluations 
of the political ramifi cations for the up-
coming presidential election. US Chief 
Justice Roberts’ surprise decision to 
 uphold the ACA has emerged as a signifi -
cant focus of political and legal scrutiny.3
On 12 April 2012, the Supreme Court 
of India in Society for Unaided Private 
Schools of Rajasthan vs Union of India4 
upheld the constitutional validity of the 
Right of Children to Free and Compul-
sory Education Act 2009 (hereafter 
RTE). The Indian debate on the judgment 
has been more modest5 and approving. 
Even critics of the Indian government 
policy on education have accepted the 
judgment with mild criticism.6 However, 
much like the ACA decision the Indian 
Supreme Court’s RTE decision is likely to 
shape the future direction of the Indian 
welfare state. 
In this article we understand and 
evaluate the policy debates and legal 
deci sions discussed above as attempts by 
two constitutional liberal democracies 
to clarify the relationship between the 
state and the private sector and their 
 respective roles and responsibilities to 
secure social welfare. A comparison be-
tween healthcare in the US and educa-
tion policy in India may not satisfy some 
desirable criteria for a two-country com-
parison: we focus on different policy 
outcomes in two countries at divergent 
levels of development with different 
 political and bureaucratic systems to 
 deliver social welfare. However, at a 
slightly higher level of abstraction two 
very different countries have reached 
similar policy arrangements as a result 
of these Supreme Court decisions. 
In both cases there was an attempt at 
reconfi guring the role of the private 
 sector to take on some responsibility of 
welfare provisioning (albeit with differ-
ent motivations). In both cases, these 
goods were being provided in a sharply 
dualistic and entrenched system, with 
very few genuine quality options for the 
vulnerable who did not have access to 
healthcare (in the US) or education (in 
India). Accordingly a compromise was 
worked out that allowed key elements of 
the existing systems to remain un-
changed while trying to advance inclu-
sion and expand coverage. In both cases 
these compromises were challenged as 
unconstitutional and imposing positive 
obligations on private actors to promote 
welfare. In both cases, the laws were up-
held in the highest courts despite several 
unresolved ambiguities. Finally, in both 
cases, the immediate focus has been on 
the implications for the rights of private 
actors, whereas perhaps the long-term 
impact of these acts is that they have 
laid down a marker that the universal 
availability of high quality social goods 
is an enforceable obligation whose bur-
den will be met and will be shared bet-
ween the public and private sectors. So 
this  essay seeks to compare the two cas-
es  intensively to highlight similarities 
and differences  between these countries 
rather than the analytical relationships 
between chosen variables.7
A useful outcome of this comparison is 
that it allows us perhaps to highlight the 
ways in which the room to experiment 
with institutional innovations is circum-
scribed by the history, politics and state 
capacities for provisioning of social wel-
fare. In Section 1, we analyse the distinc-
tions and commonalities in the policy 
environment and background debates 
that inform the legislative intervention. 
In Section 2, we analyse the two Supreme 
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Court challenges and identify the doctri-
nal basis for the conclusions in each case. 
The concluding part of this article out-
lines policy ambiguities and implemen-
tation challenges that remain. 
1 Failures of Provisioning 
and the Genesis of the Reforms
1.1 ACA and Its Genesis
The US healthcare system has a distinct-
ly dualistic character in terms of cover-
age. On the one hand, those who possess 
good insurance – typically as a part of a 
formal employment package – have rea-
sonable and accessible care available, 
although the premiums for this health-
care have been rising substantially over 
the last few decades. For those without 
jobs or between jobs, however, insur-
ance can be cripplingly expensive to 
purchase on one’s own and as a result 
huge numbers of Americans (a common 
estimate is 50 million, or about 25% of 
non-elderly adults)8 are without health-
care for substantial periods of time. 
Once this occurs individuals become dis-
connected from the healthcare system, 
avoiding medical service and standard 
screenings for cancer, heart disease, 
which leads to poorer health outcomes. 
Furthermore, as costs of healthcare rise 
– itself a vexed fact – private insurance 
fi rms have rationed healthcare in arbi-
trary and complex ways that often 
means that even those who have health 
insurance fi nd themselves unable to 
 access some critical health services.
These facts refl ect manifest failures of 
the private sector to ensure good health-
care for the entire citizenry, and have led 
successive US presidents – albeit with 
more urgency among Democratic lead-
ers – to propose various overhauls to the 
system. While incremental changes 
have happened over the years – expan-
sion of government healthcare to seniors 
and children being a prime example – 
this app roach was seen widely as offer-
ing  ineffective palliatives. Additionally 
modest reforms were perceived to benefi t 
the politically connected private health-
care and insurance industry which had 
successively opposed large-scale reforms.
Following the election of President 
Barack Obama in 2008, for the fi rst 
time in decades, Democrats controlled 
all three branches of governments. How-
ever, the majority consisted of senators 
and  congressmen and congresswomen 
with varying degrees of commitment to 
progressive goals and a large proportion 
of  “blue-dog democrats”. This, in turn, 
meant that any law that was passed 
would need serious negotiation and poli-
tical capital, especially when combined 
with a sharp tack to the right of the 
 opposition.  Nevertheless, the mandate 
was there to try and enact a law that 
 attempted to exp and coverage, while 
 reducing costs and improving the health-
care delivery  system. In order to do so a 
spectrum of approaches had been put 
forth over the years.
Single payer healthcare was perhaps 
the most radical of possible reforms for 
which the government would collect all 
healthcare fees and pay out all health-
care costs. The private sector insurance 
companies – perhaps the biggest benefi -
ciaries of the current framework – would 
be eliminated and an insurance pool, 
run by the state and fi nanced by taxes, 
employees and employers would fund 
healthcare. The cost savings from ratio-
nalising the costly administration of the 
current system would, it was argued, 
more than suffi ce to increase coverage 
for the majority of the population.
The public option was a second policy 
approach, that required active provision 
by the government but not the folding up 
of insurance into publicly-funded health-
care. The idea here was to provide a fed-
erally sponsored health insurance plan 
that would compete with private insur-
ance companies but that promised to af-
ford the uninsured a cheaper option by 
offering lower rates than  private insur-
ance companies. This it could do by us-
ing its leverage to  negotiate lower prices 
from hospitals and phar ma ceu tical com-
panies and by  saving on  admi nistrative 
costs. While the public option was a 
smaller weapon to force needed competi-
tion into the  private  insurance market, 
it was vie wed with equal concern by 
private  sector insurance.
During the course of the debate, it 
 became clear that the Obama adminis-
tration put little political capital behind 
 either of these approaches. While the 
president had earlier claimed support 
for the idea of single payer health and 
universal healthcare, his speech to the 
joint session of Congress in September 
2009 suggested a revision of opinion 
and a conviction that such an approach 
was too radical, and unlikely to garner 
enough political support.9 The public 
 option, despite widespread support 
was something that the administration 
supported late in the negotiations and 
drop ped quickly, partly as a result of 
the  political calculus involved with 
the more conservative Democrats but 
partly  because of negotiations with the 
poli tical representatives of the for-profi t 
health sector.
Once the two main options for direct 
government provisioning of health in-
surance were abandoned the only option 
was to fi nd ways to expand coverage 
through the private insurance market. 
This meant adopting a method by which 
those outside the system of healthcare 
were brought into the market for the 
cross-subsidising effects of health insur-
ance to work. In order to implement this, 
the government pivoted towards adopt-
ing a policy that would take on an ap-
proach, key elements of which originat-
ed with the political Right – the Heritage 
foundation in 198910 – and that was 
largely adopted by Mitt Romney when 
he was the governor of Massachusetts. 
The plan that was fi nally adopted left 
the existing system largely in place but 
tried to expand coverage. The compro-
mise that was adopted was complex, but 
involved some key features. First, the 
adoption of a controversial “individual 
mandate” which required US citizens 
and legal residents to have health insur-
ance or to face a penalty; second a wide 
range of subsidies and tax credits for the 
poor;  third, to expand public and em-
ployer contributions to insurance.11 De-
spite the incremental and even right-
centrist approach, the law passed the 
house narrowly in 2010 and many 
 opposed it as an unprecedented expan-
sion of government powers.
1.2 RTE and Its Genesis
The failures of the existing educational 
system in India hardly require reiteration. 
After over six decades of Independence, 
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the basic statistics on education make 
for dire reading. Illiteracy remains high 
at about 25% according to the 2011 Cen-
sus, although functional illiteracy is al-
most certainly higher. While there has 
been some progress in terms of offi cial 
enrolment, learning outcomes are poor as 
evidenced by several non-governmental 
organisation reports.12 The often talked 
about ills of education in India – teacher 
absenteeism, overextended teachers and 
infrastructure, poor systems of payments, 
poor quality of teaching and so on – 
 remain pervasive.
The multilayered school system that 
developed is both a cause of and re-
sponse to this vicious state of affairs. 
The primary responsibility for school 
education is with the state government. 
The union government has established 
high quality public institutions such as 
the Kendriya or Navodaya Vidyalayas 
which are not available to the vast ma-
jority of the population. More recently, 
the union government has funded a ma-
jor part of state education expenditure 
through the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan mis-
sion. While the state school system edu-
cates nearly 80% of the student popula-
tion, the remaining 20% of the students 
are educated in private institutions 
which may or may not receive state aid. 
The private education system includes 
an elite highly selective school system 
which excludes a vast majority of the 
population and a low cost segment 
which attracts several parents dissatis-
fi ed with the state school system.
The problem of an uneven, unfair and 
inadequate provision of education has 
been recognised for a long time, with 
perhaps the most radical reform being 
suggested by the Kothari Commission of 
1964-6613 and the promotion of the Com-
mon School System based on Neighbour-
hood Schools (CSS-NS). Such a reform 
would perhaps have most readily been 
implementable in the 1970s, after which 
the middle class and upper class de-
camped in what Anil Sadgopal has called 
“The Grand Escape”14 from public to 
 private schools. 
As of 2007-08, statistics quoted by the 
Supreme Court suggested that 80.2% of 
elementary schools were government- 
run, with about 13.1% being private 
 unaided schools. The growth and en-
trenchment of the private educational 
system, especially among the elite has 
meant that any serious radical reforms 
was bound to meet with some resistance 
from the sector. Moreover, as is evident 
from more recent observation, particular-
ly the ASER report of 2011 and Narayan 
(2010),15 the poor have been exiting the 
public system in droves in favour of pri-
vate education. These facts suggest two 
approaches – fi rst, to strongly  expand the 
quality and scale of the public education 
system and second, to ensure that those 
entering the private school system have 
access to good  private schools.
While civil society groups criticised 
the failings of the education sector thr-
ough the decades following the  Kothari 
Commission, the issue of education for 
all received scant government attention. 
Education for all remained a directive 
principle till the 1993 Unni krishnan 
judgment that elevated primary educa-
tion to the status of a fundamental right. 
Drawing upon this  judgment, various 
governments pushed towards a constitu-
tional amendment that secured educa-
tion as a fundamental right (the 86th 
amendment, passed in 2002).
Following this, perhaps the most 
 signifi cant act came with the introduc-
tion of the Right to Education Bill which 
sought to create an enforcement for pri-
mary education for all and to utilise the 
language of rights for the fi rst time in so 
doing. The bill itself went through some 
negotiation before becoming the Right 
to Education Act in 2009 which speci-
fi ed several inputs that were necessary 
for the successful implementation of the 
goals envisioned. These involved signifi -
cantly greater expansion and provision-
ing by the government, but also added 
elements that involved a reconfi guration 
of the role of the private sector. Perhaps 
most contentious was the idea of the 
 retention of a 25% neighbourhood quota 
for children of disadvantaged groups in 
private schools as a method of social in-
clusion. This meant, in turn, that in 
practice the State must be involved, par-
tially at least, in some of the regulation 
of the school. The implications of these 
reconfi gurations led directly to the 
 Supreme Court challenge.
2 The Question of Legality
2.1 ACA and the 
Constitutional Challenge
Almost immediately after its enactment 
by President Obama the ACA was challen-
ged in the courts on the grounds of con-
stitutionality. The constitutional challen-
ges focused on two issues: fi rst, the indi-
vidual mandate to maintain minimum 
essential health insurance coverage. A 
failure to secure such coverage by 2014 
results in a penalty to be paid along with 
an individual’s taxes. It was argued that 
the individual mandate does not fall 
within the Congress’ power to exercise 
the power to regulate commerce and 
that it does not fall within Congress’ 
power to “lay and collect taxes”. Second, 
the Act expands the Medicaid pro-
grammes run by the states to include all 
adults with incomes up to 133% of the 
federal poverty line supported by addi-
tional federal funding. However, states 
that fail to comply with this requirement 
stand to lose all their federal Medicaid 
funding. This part of the Act was chal-
lenged on the grounds that it went 
 beyond Congress’ power under the 
“Spending Clause”, as it compels states 
to accept the Medicaid expansion.
A majority of the Court concluded that 
the expansion of Medicaid under the 
Spending Clause went beyond the sys-
tem of federalism in the US. In particular 
they took the view that the expanded 
Medicaid programme did not alter or 
amend the existing programme but radi-
cally overhauled it. Hence, the Court 
concluded that it would excise the pen-
alty on states but retain a voluntary op-
tion to expand the programme. The 
sharp division of the Court is with re-
spect to the constitutionality of the indi-
vidual mandate. Chief Justice Roberts’ 
decisive opinion took the view that the 
individual mandate compels individuals 
to become active in commerce by pur-
chasing a product. He agreed with the 
petitioners that the individual mandate 
went beyond the Commerce Clause to 
allow Congress to regulate what people 
do not do, thereby opening up a wide 
new jurisdiction and going beyond the 
constitutional vision of a government 
with limited and enumerated powers. 
COMMENTARY
september 1, 2012 vol xlvii no 35 EPW  Economic & Political Weekly34
However, he concluded that the penalty 
imposed on those who fail to satisfy the 
individual mandate may be reasonably 
construed to be a tax. By choosing to in-
terpret the penalty constructively as a 
tax the plural majority upheld the con-
stitutionality of the Act. 
Chief Justice Roberts’ controlling 
opinion16 upholds the ACA by construing 
the individual mandate to be a tax. Chief 
Justice Roberts  justifi ed his conclusion 
relying on the proposition that “every 
reasonable construction must be resort-
ed to, in order to save a statute from 
unconstitutionality”.17 Both supporters18 
and critics19 of the ACA agree that such 
judicial deference is uncharacteristic of 
Chief Justice Roberts and notably he 
agrees with the dissenting judges of the 
Court on all other substantive constitu-
tional questions before the Court. Never-
theless, most commentators commend-
ed Chief Justice Roberts for enhancing 
the reputation of the Court20 by breaking 
its political gridlock.21 
2.2 RTE and the 
Constitutional Challenge
On 12 April 2012, the Supreme Court of 
India in Society for Unaided Private 
Schools of Rajasthan vs Union of India 
upheld the constitutional validity of the 
Right of Children to Free and Compul-
sory Education Act 2009. Several private 
schools (aided, unaided, minority and 
non-minority) had challenged the con-
stitutionality of the Act on two major 
grounds: fi rst, that the Section 12(1)(c) 
obligation on private unaided schools to 
provide free and compulsory education 
to children from weaker and disadvan-
taged sections up to 25% of the class 
strength and various provisions of the 
Act which imposed infrastructural and 
regulatory requirements on the schools 
violated their Article 19(1)(g) constitu-
tional right to freedom of occupation. 
Second, minority schools argued that 
the Act violated their special constitu-
tional rights in Article 30(1) to establish 
and administer educational institutions. 
Chief Justice Kapadia speaking for the 
majority upheld the constitutional valid-
ity of the Act so far as it applied to pri-
vate non-minority schools and aided 
 minority schools. However, he held that 
the entire Act of 2009, including the 
Section 12(1)(c) quota, would not apply 
to un aided minority schools. Justice 
Radha krishnan’s dissent held the Act to 
be uniformly applicable to minority and 
non-minority schools but read down 
Section 12(1)(c) so far as it imposed a 
positive  obligation of providing free and 
compulsory education on all private 
 unaided schools. 
The divided opinion of the court arises 
out of the relative priority accorded to 
apparently confl icting rights and values 
in the Constitution. The majority con-
cludes that the Article 21A right to edu-
cation, derived from the Article 21 guar-
antee of the right to life, may subordi-
nate the Article 19(1)(g) right to freedom 
of occupation. Further, the regulatory 
power of the state to impose reasonable 
restrictions under Article 19(6) draws 
support from the directive principles of 
state policy that mandate universal edu-
cation and protection of children’s inter-
ests. However, the majority concludes 
that the interests of minority groups pro-
tected under Article 30(1) read with the 
bar on reservation in Article 15(5) are 
absolute in character and trumps the 
 Article 21A right to education. If the 
 Article 21A right to education may sub-
ordinate Article 19 civil rights and 
freedoms why does it not subordinate 
minority rights under Article 30(1)? The 
majority does not offer a convincing jus-
tifi cation for this view and its reliance on 
precedent is inconclusive. 
The minority opinion develops a more 
symmetrical view of the balance bet-
ween rights. It concludes that Article 21A 
right to education subordinates both 
 Article 19(1)(g) freedoms of school ad-
ministrators and Article 30(1) freedoms 
of minority school administrators. How-
ever, it concludes that Article 21A right 
to education is a limited right that cre-
ates exclusively a state obligation which 
cannot be imposed as positive obliga-
tions on private schools. While Justice 
Radhakrishnan considered the argu-
ments regarding the horizontal applica-
tion of rights in great detail and expre-
ssly rejected this argument, Justice 
 Kapadia’s majority view on the capacity 
of the state to impose positive obliga-
tions on private actors to promote 
 welfare  accepts the horizontal applica-
tion but in an inarticulate manner. 
The judgment of the Supreme Court 
has been generally welcomed as a sig-
nifi cant effort towards achieving social 
equity22 and a contribution to nation- 
building.23 However, the exclusion of 
minority schools from the application of 
the Act by holding that part of the Act 
unconstitutional may leave out an infl u-
ential segment of school providers from 
the Act’s mandate.24 As many state gov-
ernments are yet to devise rules on the 
identifi cation of minority schools25 there 
is little clarity on the scope and extent of 
this exclusion. 
3 Implementation 
and Ambiguities
3.1 ACA
In the US despite the ruling, at the cur-
rent juncture, several relevant questions 
remain about the implications of the 
ACA. While it is too early to say how 
these will be resolved, it may be useful 
to point out some of the areas in which 
there will certainly be future debate and 
public policy enactments. First, accord-
ing to the Congressional Budget Offi ce, 
the ACA will still leave about 20 million 
people uninsured when fully implement-
ed.26 There is a lack of clarity as to how 
insurance coverage will work for these 
individuals and how they will be brought 
into the system. A second major issue 
has to do with the changes in employer-
provided health insurance that will be-
come evident as a result of the law. One 
concern is that employers will reduce or 
eliminate insurance and force their em-
ployees onto subsidised public insurance 
while paying minimal penalties as a re-
sult. The consideration of penalties will 
certainly be approached again in the 
years to come. A third important ques-
tion is the response of the states to the 
law. One provision – Section 1332 –  sug-
gests that states can devise their own 
plans for expanding coverage, perhaps 
allowing for single payer plans at the 
state level. Whether or not this will be 
taken up remains to be seen. Equally, 
some states may make use of the “opt-
out” provision of the law and opt out of 
Medicaid expansion. This, in turn, will 
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substantially reduce the numbers of in-
sured. Finally, there is the question as to 
how costs will be controlled in the long 
term – with little to no clarity as to the 
ways in which the current system will 
do so. Each of these points is likely to be 
debated in the years to come.
3.2 RTE and Implementation
The decision of the Supreme Court up-
holding the constitutionality of the RTE 
Act has spurred various states into ac-
tion to implement the Act. In the last few 
months several states have notifi ed their 
rules and begun regulating admission 
to, and accreditation of, schools. How-
ever, signifi cant legal and policy chal-
lenges remain and these are likely to be 
resolved over several years. 
The RTE Act has been criticised for its 
lack of focus on securing quality educa-
tion with a regulatory emphasis on 
measuring inputs rather than outputs.27 
The majority opinion opens a small win-
dow to redress this imbalance in the Act 
as it casts a duty on state governments to 
ensure quality education and to “re- 
organise...(their) fi nancial outfl ow...by 
weeding out the non-performing or 
 under-performing or non-compliance 
schools receiving grant-in- aid…”. Hence, 
the capacity of state governments to 
 implement the Act to ensure quality edu-
cation will determine its success. Civil 
society groups will need to mobilise the 
grievance redressal machinery provided 
under the Act as well as the courts to 
 secure quality education. 
Second, the exemptions under the Act 
need to be closely monitored. Minority 
schools are exempted from the applica-
tion of the entire Act and state govern-
ments need to develop a systematic rig-
orous method of identifi cation of minor-
ity schools entitled to this benefi t. While 
the RTE Act does not defi ne minority 
schools, several other judgments of the 
Supreme Court have dealt with this 
question. The judgment calls upon state 
governments to frame rules to govern 
boarding schools – a category not men-
tioned in the Act. The manner in which 
state rules determine the scope and 
 nature of these exemptions will have a 
signifi cant impact on the outcomes of 
the RTE Act.
The 2009 Act institutes a universal 
 legal commitment to provide free and 
compulsory education to all children be-
tween 6 and 14 years of age. This legisla-
tion initiates a new approach to social 
welfare in two important ways: fi rst, it 
creates a universal entitlement and does 
not rely on targeting particular social 
groups marked by ethnic, religious or 
other identity markers. Second, it inte-
grates the efforts of the state and non-
state sectors to provide for welfare in 
 order to build an inclusive and solidari-
stic society. The true signifi cance of the 
 Supreme Court’s decision upholding the 
constitutionality of the Act in both these 
respects is that it paves the way for simi-
lar reforms in allied fi elds like health 
and housing. Again, the extent to which 
the law allows for such additional chang-
es and the ways in which authorities and 
the private sector respond to this will be 
the subject of ongoing debate.
4 Distinctions in Approaches 
So far we have provided a narrative of 
the interesting parallels and similarities 
between two recent landmark cases on 
social good provisioning in the US and 
India, the comparison should not be 
overdrawn. In particular, two salient 
differences mark the debate in the two 
countries. First, the manner in which en-
trenched private interests defended their 
position varied vastly across the two 
polities. Second, the framing of the legal 
debate differs signifi cantly, taking on a 
rights-based approach in India and a 
regulatory approach in the US.
In the US despite strong public support 
for reform, despite proof of successful 
government provision of healthcare in 
the form of Medicaid, Medicare and Vet-
erans Healthcare and despite particu-
larly strong support for increased gov-
ernment intervention in the form of a 
public health insurance option, the for-
profi t sector orchestrated a very success-
ful campaign to minimise the enlarge-
ment of the public sector and to delegiti-
mise the very idea of government provi-
sion of healthcare. Obamacare is now a 
pejorative in American discourse and 
despite the peculiar nature of the consti-
tutional challenge and its rejection, the 
Republican Party has made its revoking 
a central part of its platform. In India, by 
contrast, although the RTE provokes 
some sharp response among the middle 
classes, there is no political movement 
to work against the law. While some 
 argue that the compromise is poorly 
thought out and refl ects the further com-
modifi cation of education,28 when com-
pared with the response of the for-profi t 
healthcare sector response to the ACA, 
the resistance of the for profi t education 
sector in India has been relatively weak. 
The Indian legal debate on the consti-
tutionality of the RTE Act has focused on 
securing the appropriate balance be-
tween competing rights and between 
fundamental rights and directive princi-
ples. So the courts have had to deter-
mine whether the right to education of a 
student should override the school own-
er’s right to freedom of occupation and, 
wherever applicable, the minority school 
owners right to establish and maintain 
an educational institution of their choice. 
The directive principles, which mandate 
that the state shall secure the equitable 
distribution of opportunity and resour-
ces, guide the court seeking a balance 
between confl icting rights. The evoca-
tive character of the rights discourse 
 allows the student to emerge as the cen-
tral  focus of the Court’s moral attention 
thereby allowing scarce normative 
grounds for an argument against the 
right to education. 
In the US Supreme Court, the health-
care decision is not understood as a 
rights question at all. Instead the legal 
argument rests on the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Congress under the commerce 
clause and the tax clause. The Court is 
called on to determine whether the ACA 
is a justifi able exercise of these powers 
and whether this exercise does not tres-
pass on individual and state autonomy. 
Hence, this legal discourse takes away 
attention from the core policy objectives 
of providing healthcare and focuses on 
the distribution of state power in a fed-
eral constitutional system. Notably, the 
US Supreme Court judgment does not 
use the word “justice” even once unless 
there is a honorifi c reference to a judge! 
There is an enduring tradition in west 
Europe and the US to design social 
 welfare around an insurance principle29 
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rather than an explicitly rights-based 
moral argument. Chief Justice Robert’s 
reconfi guration of the penalty on the in-
dividual mandate as a tax, may implicit-
ly suggest an invocation of an insurance 
model of social welfare but on the whole, 
the judicial and doctrinal discourse is 
marked by the absence of these concerns 
in the area of healthcare. 
Despite these differences, one critical 
point of similarity remains. Seen in the 
best light, both the ACA and the RTE Act 
– highly imperfect in genesis and detail 
as they are – make a symbolic commit-
ment to redress signifi cant failures to 
provide key social welfare services in 
the US and India. In both countries, the 
continued inability of society to provide 
these critical social goods refl ects a fail-
ure of politics and institutional imagina-
tion. Given that these social goods have 
nevertheless been provisioned by the 
private sector, pragmatic and perhaps 
even somewhat ethically compromised 
laws try to secure better welfare out-
comes without threatening existing 
power equations. No matter what out-
comes are secured by these legislations, 
the high profi le legal challenges to them 
ensure that they will emerge as norma-
tive baselines whose expressive value 
will shape future debates on social wel-
fare. To the extent that these laws suc-
ceed in providing a minimum bar and 
ensure that these social goods are seen 
to be a genuine requirement for all, they 
will secure some element of political 
 decency for their societies.
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